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) 
[8. F. No. 17746. In Bank. NOT. 19, 1948.J 
CARL SJOBERG et a1., Respondents, v. H. C. H.ASTORF 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Judgments-Number in Case. - Under California procedure 
there is ordinarily only one final judgment in an action. 
[2] Id.-Number in Case.-A cross-complaint is not considered 
sufficiently independent to allow a separate final judgment to 
be entered upon it, unless the judgment or order on the cross-
complaint may be considered final as to some of the parties. 
[3] Arbitration-Appeal.-Where the parties to an action for 
breach of contract and a cross-petition to stny the trial and 
refer the matter to arbitration are identical, an appeal cannot 
be allowed merely because an order dismissing the cross-
petition has been made. 
[4] Appeal-Orders Appealable-Final Determination of Col-
lateral !rIatters.-An appeal from an order is allowed if the 
order is 8 final judgment against a party in a collateral pro-
ceeding growing out of the action. It is not sufficient that 
the order determine finally for the purposes of further pro-
ceedings in the trial court some distinct issue in the case; 
it must direct the payment of money by appellant or the 
performance of an act by or against him. 
[6] Arbitration-Appeal.-An order staying an action for breach 
of contract and directing that arbitration proceed is not 
appealable where it does ndt direct the payment of money by 
appellant or the performance of an act by or against him. 
Any right· to arbitration may be asserted on appeal from the 
final judgment in the contract action. 
[1] See 14 Cal.Jur. 951; 31 Am.Jur. 95. 
!ricK. Dig. References: [1] JUdgments, § 86; [2) Judgments, 
187; [3, 5] Arbitration, § 48 j [4] Appeal and Error, 132. 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
~!nteo County staying an action and directing that arbitra-
tion proceed. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge. Appeal dismissed. 
Hadsell, Sweet & Ingalls and Sydney P. Murman for Appel-
lants. 
Cosgriff, Carr, McClellan & Ingersoll and Luther M. Can' 
for P.espondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs and defendants executed a con-
tract whereby plaintiffs were to build a house for defendants. 
Payments were to be made in installments as the work 
progressed and, according to defendants, the contract con· 
tained a clause providing for arbitration of any disputes 
arising out of the contract. Defendants, dissatisfied with 
some of the work and materials, refused to pay the last two 
installments due, and plaintiffs brought suit for this balance. 
Defendants then petitioned the trial court for an order direct-
ing that arbitration proceed and staying plaintiffs' action. 
After hearing, the trial court found that there was no agree-
ment for arbitration and ordered defendants' petition dis· 
missed. Defendants appeal from this order. Plaintiffs contend 
that the order is not appealable. 
Section 1282 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for 
an order compelling arbitration, and section 1284 provides 
for a stay of suit pending arbitration. Defendants seek relief 
under both sections. Section 1293 provides that "An appeal 
may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting 
or vacating an award, or from a judgment entered upon an ..... _. __ 
award. as from an order or judgment in an action" and ill 
concerned only with appeals after arbitration. Provision for 
an appeal in this case must be found, if at all, in section 963 
of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for appeals from 
final judgments in special proceedings. Appellants contend 
that the issue of the appealability of an order denying arbi· 
tration was settled in their favor, by implication at least, in 
Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Ca1.2d 335 [182 
P.2d 182]. In that case, however, no action on the contract 
had been previously instituted. Thus the trial court's dis-
missal of the petition resulted in a final determination of the 
litigation before the court and was a final judgment in a spe-
cial procecding. Appellants' petition hcre is essentially a 
crOtiS.eomplaint for specific performance of a contract to arbi-
) 
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trate (see Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., supra, 347), 
and its dismissal did not terminate the main action. The 
Trubowitch case is therefore not controlling. 
[1] Under California procedure there is 9rdinarily only 
one final judgment in an action. (Stockton etc. Works v. 
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557, 577 [33 P. 633] ; Doudell v. 
Shoo, 159 Cal. 448, 454 l114 P. 579]; Gunder v. Gunder, 
208 Cal. 559, 561 [282 P. 794] ; Middleton v. Finney, 214 Cal. 
523, 525 [6 P.2d 938, 78 A.L.R. 1104] ; Bank 01 America v. 
Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701 [128 P.2d 357J; Nicho1,.. 
son v. Henderson, 25 Cal.2d 375, 378 [153 P.2d 945].) 
[2] A cross-complaint is not considered sufficiently inde-
pendent to allow a separate. final judgment to be entered upon 
it (Stockton etc. Works v. Glens FaUs Ins. Co., supra; Yandell 
v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 234, 235 [4 P.2d 947]; 
Nicholson v. Henderson, supra, 381; Merchants Nat. Bk. v. 
Clark-Parker Co., 97 Cal.App. 757, 759 [276 P. 387] ; Pritch-
ard v. King, 104 Cal.App. 460, 461 [285 P. 1086] ; see Howe 
v. Key System Transit Co., 198 Cal. 525, 529 [246 P. 391), 
unless the judgment or order on the cross-complaint !IIay be 
con.qidered final as to some of the parties. ( Howe v. Key 
Sy.'ftem Transit Co., supra; Young v. Superior COllrt, 16 Cal. 
2d 211, 214 [105 P,2d 363] ; Trask v. Moore, 24 Cal.2d 36:). 
373 [149 P.2d 854].) [3] Since the parties to the contract 
action and cross-petition in this case are identical, an appeal 
cannot be allowed merely because an order dismissing the 
cross-petition has been made. 
The question remains whether the order may be considered 
a final judgment in a collateral proceeding growing out of 
the action. The present case is similar to that in which thc 
court enters an order to compel arbitration under section 
- --"1282 -of the "Code of Civil Procedure.' In both cases the 
question is whether the ruling as th the rjght to arbitration 
may be considered such a final determination of that issue as 
to give rise to a right to appeal. The authoriHes in other 
jurisdictions with similar arbitration statutes are in conflict. 
The New York courts have taken the view that an order 
staying trial and directing arbitration is appealable as one 
that finally determines a special proceeding, which is con-
sidered distinct and separate from the arbitration proceedings 
that follow. (Hosiery Mlrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N.Y. 22 
(143 N.E. 779]; Marchant v. Mead-Morrison M. Co., 252 
N.Y. 284 (169 N.E. 386]., The United States Supreme Court 
has held, however, that orders refusing to stay trial or to direct 
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ltrbitration and those granting stays and ordering arbitration 
are interlocutory and not appealable 8S final judgments. 
(Shanferoke 00. v. Westchester 00., 293 U.S. 449, 451 [55 
S.Ct. 313, 79 L.Ed. 583] ; Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Line, 
294 U.S. 454, 456 [55 S.Ct. 475, 79 L.Ed. 989].) The Califor-
uia cases hold that neither an order directing arbitration 
(Jardine-Matheson 00., Ltd. v. Pacific Orient 00., 100 Cal. 
App. 572 [280 P. 697]), nor an order refusing to stay trial 
pending arbitration is appealable. (Fischer v. Superior Oou,.t, 
105 Cal.App. 466. 470 [287 P. 556].) 
The foregoing federal and California cases are in accord 
with the general rules in this state governing appeals from 
orders that do not finally determine all the issues before the 
trial court. [4] An appeal is allowed if the order is a final 
judgment against a party in a collateral proceeding growing 
out of the action. (Grant v. Superior Oourt, 106 Cal. 324. 
325 [39 P. 604] ; Grant v. Los Angeles etc. By. 00., 116 Cal. 
71,72 [47 P. 872] ; Fish v. Fish, 216 Cal. 14, 16 [13 P.2d 375].) 
It is not sufficient that the order determine finally for the 
purposes of further proceedings in the trial court some distinct 
issue in the case; it must direct the payment of money by 
appellant or the performance of an act by or against him. 
(Grant v. Superior Oourt, supra, 326; Los Angeles v. Los 
Angeles O. Water 00., 134 Cal. 121, 124 [66 P. 198]; Free 
. Gold Mining 00. v. Spiers, 135 Cal. 130, 131 [67 P. 611; 
Title Ins. &- Trust 00. v. Oalifornia etc. 00., 159 Cal. 484. 
493 [114 P. 838] ; Fish v. Fish. supra, 17; Bakewell v. Bake-
well, 21 Cal.2d 224, 227 [130 P.2d 975].) [5] There is no 
such direction in the present case. If appellants have a right 
to arbitration they may assert it on the appeal from the final 
judgment in the contract action. Thus no greater hardship will 
result than in any case where a party is forced to stand trial 
because of an erroneous ruling of the trial court. 
The appeal is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J .• Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
